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Partisan Attachment and Conspiracist Predispositions: An Investigation into the 
Causes of Conspiracist Thinking
Abstract
Conspiracy theories have increasing relevance in American politics. In the age of the internet, 
where rumors and their associated conspiracy theories are transmitted and received at 
much higher frequencies than was previously capable, people can be led to believe in ideas 
that erode their trust in government and its decision makers. This undermines America’s 
capacity for self-governance. In this proposal, I articulate a model that fully explains 
conspiracist thinking in the context of American politics. I suggest that two domains—
partisan attachment and underlying conspiracist predispositions—determine whether an 
individual will accept or reject a conspiracy theory. To measure the effects of these two 
domains on opinion formation, I propose a cross-sectional analysis that incorporates two 
separate survey instruments. However, due to time limitations, the scope of this paper is 
confined to a research proposal; I do not collect any data to support my hypotheses.
Keywords: conspiracism, partisan bias, American politics, social identity theory, public 
opinion
Introduction
Recent studies (Darwin et al., 2011; Coles and Swami, 2010) show that conspiracism 
is no longer a fringe phenomenon, but a growing part of the mainstream public 
opinion. New social media forums like Facebook and Twitter have exacerbated this 
trend by allowing users to transmit and receive conspiracy theories and associated 
falsehoods at much higher frequencies than was previously capable (Barkun, 2013; 
Prior, 2013). This has profound implications for American politics. For instance, 
conspiracist thinking correlates with lower levels of faith in public officials and 
institutions (Einstein and Glick, 2015; Sunstein, 2009), lower rates of vaccination 
among children (Douglas and Jolley, 2014a), rejection of climate science (Gignac et 
al., 2013), decreased voter turnout (Douglas and Jolley, 2014b), and lower levels of 
civic engagement (Parent and Uscinski, 2014). Because social media usage is unlikely 
to decrease in the future, it is important to understand the underlying mechanisms 
that motivate conspiracist thinking, especially in the context of American politics.
Researchers have long sought to understand the root causes of conspiracism. Some 
find that conspiracist thinking stems from feelings of powerlessness, anomie, and 
economic and personal insecurity (Crocker et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994); from 
paranoia and paranormal ideation (Darwin et al., 2011; Hofstadter, 1964); and from a 
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need to reduce the psychological tension caused by unexplained phenomena (Jacques 
and McCauley, 1979; Shermer, 2011). Thus far, the scholarship on conspiracism has 
largely focused on reactions to specific theories (Hargrove et al., 2007; McHoskey, 
1995), reactions from specific communities (Waters, 1997; Goertzel, 1994), and the 
origins of conspiracy theories within the mass public (Davis, 1971; Keeley, 1999; 
Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009). However, these studies limit themselves to the 
psychological and social factors that predispose people to conspiracist thinking in 
general. They do not consider the factors to cause people to accept some theories 
but reject others. Oliver and Wood (2014) and Coles et al. (2011) do shed light on 
this question by suggesting that two domains are activated when individuals interact 
with conspiracy theories: (1) pre-existing partisan attachment and (2) underlying 
conspiracist predispositions.
In this paper, I construct a model of conspiracist thinking which holds that partisan 
attachment and conspiracist predispositions (Oliver and Wood, 2014; Coles et al., 
2011) condition responses to and interpretations of conspiracy theories. I argue 
that (1) innate conspiracist tendencies determine whether an individual is likely to 
believe in conspiracy theories at all and (2) partisan attachment determines whether 
these theories will be accepted or rejected. I expect partisan attachment to be a more 
effective predictor of conspiracy theory acceptance when the partisan in question 
is already predisposed to conspiracist thinking. While there are other variables that 
play a similarly influential role in determining individual acceptance or rejection 
of conspiracy theories, I focus on partisan attachment alone because it exerts the 
single most powerful influence on political opinion formation (Campbell et al., 
1960). For my research design, I propose a cross-sectional study in which I measure 
the conspiracist and partisan predispositions of the respondents by judging their 
reactions to different conspiracy theory stimuli. This method allows me to separate 
the respondents into two classes (conspiracists and nonconspiracists) and thus isolate 
the effects of partisan attachment on conspiracy theory selection. However, due to 
limitations of time and resources, the scope of this paper is restricted to a research 
proposal: I do not collect any data to support my hypotheses. I merely delineate the 
contours of a study that I would implement should I eventually be able to collect data.
This proposal is valuable to the study of conspiracy theories for two reasons. First, 
it introduces a new method for gauging conspiracist tendencies. Previous studies 
focusing on the role of partisanship in conspiracy theory selection neglected to 
separate partisan attachment from conspiracist predispositions. I solve this issue by 
creating two separate survey instruments, one which measures the strength of the 
respondent’s underlying conspiracist tendencies and one which measures the strength 
of the respondent’s partisan attachment. Second, this study emphasizes partisan 
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attachment as an influential variable in conspiracy theory selection insofar as it is 
coupled with pre-existing conspiracist predispositions; otherwise, its effects should 
be largely negligible (Oliver and Wood, 2014; Coles et al., 2011). Both of these 
innovations contribute to a more robust understanding of conspiracism and help to 
guide future scholars working in the field.
Literature Review
Research on conspiracism (Coles et al., 2011; Goertzel, 1994; Oliver and Wood, 
2014) suggests that partisan attachment plays an important role in determining 
individual acceptance as well as formation of conspiracy theories. I synthesize the 
literatures on partisanship and conspiracism to show that conspiracy theories trigger 
two domains within individuals: (1) their partisan affiliation and (2) their conspiracist 
predispositions. In section 1, I list key terms that appear throughout this article and 
give them each a specific meaning; in section 2, I review the literature on partisan 
identification and outline a theory of partisan bias; and in section 3, I discuss the 
central characteristics that comprise a conspiracist predisposition.
I. Definitions
First, I define conspiracy as a secret plan made by two or more people to do something 
that is illegal or harmful to the public (Shermer, 2011). Second, I define conspiracy 
theory as an attempt to explain a particular event or action as being the product of a 
conspiracy (Douglas and Jolley, 2014b). The distinguishing features of a conspiracy 
theory are that the explanation of the incident is (1) different from the official account 
and (2) unsupported by evidence (Sunstein, 2009). According to these definitions, 
the 9/11 attacks were a conspiracy, insofar as they were organized in secret by a 
confederation of terrorists who acted illegally to perpetrate a violent act. In contrast, 
the “9/11 Truth” movement, which maintains that select members of the United 
States government, among others, are responsible for the attacks, is a conspiracy 
theory. Third, I define conspiracism as a tendency to engage in conspiracist thinking 
and accept conspiratorial explanations for extraordinary events. This tendency is 
largely motivated by innate psychological attributions, not external factors (Oliver 
and Wood, 2014; Shermer, 1997).
II. Partisan Attachment
Initial studies of voting behavior identified partisan attachment as the most important 
influence on opinion formation (Berelson et al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1960), and 
current scholarship (Krosnick et al., 2015; Parent and Uscinski, 2014) suggests that 
there is a similar connection between partisanship and conspiracism. I assume that 
Issue 11: 2017 | 19
Robert Earnest
this is because citizens have a personal relationship with their parties (Mason, 2015) 
and filter information through the screen of partisan identification (Bolsen et al., 
2014; Campbell et al., 1960). Recent research on partisan identification (Greene, 
2004; Iyengar et al., 2012; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015) finds that partisanship 
functions similarly to other forms of group affiliation in that individual awareness 
of group status activates positive sentiments toward ingroup members and negative 
sentiments toward the outgroup (Tajfel, 1974). These attitudes manifest themselves in 
both political and nonpolitical contexts1. Partisans on average do not view their party 
more favorably today than they did previously, but they do view outparty members 
much more negatively (Abramowitz and Webster, 2015). This suggests that partisans 
are more likely to accept conspiracy theories that implicate outparty members than 
they are to reject theories implicating inparty members.
Furthermore, conventional models of public opinion posit that individuals 
interpret information in relation to their prior convictions (Zaller, 1992). They 
adopt new beliefs if those beliefs fit in with or complement what they believe or 
already know; they disregard them if they do not (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009). 
I expect partisan biases to govern the interaction between partisans and conspiracy 
theories in a similar manner. For instance, if an individual accepts that Lyndon B. 
Johnson’s Great Society programs were designed to keep minorities forever indebted 
to the Democratic Party, it is likely because this new belief fits in with their pre-
existing conceptions of Lyndon B. Johnson and the Democratic Party (Sunstein, 
2009). However, this type of response is contingent on partisan “activation,” 
because if partisans are to respond to party cues, they must first be made aware 
of them (Kuo and Malhotra, 2008). Conspiracy theories that contain a partisan 
element should therefore produce the most noticeable reaction.
Although partisan attachment helps to explain why certain partisans might accept 
one conspiracy theory and reject another, it does not constitute a sufficient or 
comprehensive explanation of conspiracism, because not all Democrats subscribe 
to conspiracy theories that are largely endorsed by Democrats (like the Iraq-
oil conspiracy theory) nor do all Republicans subscribe to conspiracy theories 
largely endorsed by Republicans (like the Vincent Foster assassination theory)2. 
Furthermore, Independents endorse conspiracy theories implicating Democrats and 
1  Nonpolitical activities like dating (see: Bartle and Bellucci, 2009) and applicant selection in college 
admissions processes (see: Iyengar and Westwood, 2015) reveal traces of inparty over outparty 
favoritism.
2  The Iraq-oil conspiracy theory holds that the United States used the Iraq War as a pretext to cap-
ture their oil reserves; the Vincent Foster assassination theory holds that Foster was murdered as 
part of a political cover-up.
20 | Bridges: A Journal of Student Research
Republicans as frequently as Democrats and Republicans (Hargrove et al., 2007), and 
their endorsement would not be motivated by partisan bias.3 It would, however, be 
motivated by underlying psychological attributions that incline individuals to believe 
in conspiracy theories. I discuss these attributions in the following section.
III. Conspiracist Predispositions
Building on Goertzel’s (1994) and Coles et al.’s (2011) studies, Oliver and 
Wood (2014) suggest that conspiracism is predicated on two inbuilt psychological 
characteristics. The first of these, known as apophenia (Fyfe et al., 2008), is a tendency 
to attribute the source of unexplained phenomena to hidden forces by linking together 
unrelated but temporally proximate coincidences. Human beings are wont to find 
“meaningful patterns in both meaningful and meaningless noise” (Shermer, 2011,60) 
and ascribe meaning and agency to those patterns. For example, imagine yourself 
home alone, late at night. Suddenly, you hear the front door creak open downstairs, 
followed by a thump somewhere within the house. It could be that the wind blew 
open the door, which you in fact neglected to close all the way, followed by your cat 
jumping from the couch to investigate the noise, or it could be a dangerous intruder. 
Individuals predisposed to conspiracist thinking would instinctively assume that the 
noise originated from the latter source.
The second characteristic is an interest in simplified narratives as explanations of 
extraordinary events (Oliver and Wood, 2014). Our reality is an uncertain one, where 
presidents can be assassinated by lone gunmen, buildings can be toppled by airplane 
hijackers, and entire economies can collapse overnight without warning. Narratives 
are appealing because they reduce this uncertainty by providing us with ballast in an 
unpredictable social world (Knight, 2002). Conspiracy theories exhibit both of these 
characteristics, insofar as they infer causation from correlation and posit subversive, 
“unseen” agents as the forces behind important phenomena, thereby simplifying the 
sequence of events. A person predisposed to believe in conspiracy theories, therefore, 
should have a natural aversion to uncertainty and a natural attraction to narratives 
that give them some semblance of control (Oliver and Wood, 2014).
3  In a CNN opinion poll, nearly 30% of Independent and 41% of Republican respondents ex-
pressed doubts about President Obama’s birth certificate; in an American Enterprise opinion poll, 
12% of Independent and 14% of Democratic respondents agreed that the United States govern-
ment knowingly let the 9/11 attacks happen.
 
Issue 11: 2017 | 21
Robert Earnest
Theory
The first premise of this analysis is that some individuals possess certain psychological 
characteristics that incline them to accept conspiratorial explanations of extraordinary 
or disconcerting phenomena (Oliver and Wood, 2014). Accordingly, I argue that 
(1) individuals with conspiracist predispositions are more likely to believe in 
conspiracy theories than those without conspiracist predispositions and (2) the 
more conspiratorially minded the individual, the greater the number of conspiracy 
theories they will accept. The second premise of this analysis is that partisans respond 
positively to inparty members and negatively to outparty members when the relevant 
partisan information is made known to them (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015). I expect 
for partisans to behave similarly when judging conspiracy theories. I argue that (3) 
partisans rely on party cues when determining whether or not to endorse a conspiracy 
theory, and (4) partisans should be less likely to endorse a conspiracy theory if there 
are no cues present. Consequently, my hypotheses are as follows:
•  H1: Partisans will endorse a conspiracy theory more often if it implicates outparty 
members than if it does not.
As Mason (2015) suggests, partisan identification is similar to other forms of group 
affiliation in that awareness of group status activates positive sentiments toward 
ingroup members and negative sentiments toward outgroup members. I expect for 
this attitude to manifest itself during encounters with conspiracy theories as well, 
both among partisans with conspiracist predispositions and among partisans without. 
The literature indicates that partisan affiliation should be a more powerful force 
among conspiracist partisans. As a result, a great proportion of them should accept 
conspiracy theories that implicate outparty members.
•  H2: “Strong” partisans will be more likely than “weak” partisans to endorse a conspiracy 
theory that contains a partisan element.
Naturally, the relationship between partisans and party is dynamic (Campbell et 
al., 1960). Partisan attachment exists on a continuum, upon which individuals can 
be placed according to the strength or weakness of their convictions. Accordingly, 
I predict that “strong” partisans will endorse conspiracy theories implicating 
outparty members more often than “weak” partisans. This hypothesis applies to both 
conspiracist and nonconspiracist partisans, although I expect a greater number of 
endorsements in the former category.
•  H3: Conspiracist partisans will be more likely than nonconspiracist partisans to endorse 
a conspiracy theory that contains no partisan element.
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The extant literature (Oliver and Wood, 2014; Coles et al., 2011) suggests that 
conspiracist predispositions are at least as influential as partisan predispositions in 
determining whether an individual accepts or rejects a conspiracy theory as credible. 
Furthermore, as I am primarily concerned with the role of partisan attachment 
in conspiracy theory selection, the answer to this hypothesis should support the 
contention that, when a conspiracy theory does not contain a partisan element, 
partisans should rely on conspiracist tendencies to decide whether or not to accept the 
theory. If partisans are not predisposed to believe in conspiracy theories, they should 
be less likely to endorse them than those who are predisposed.
•  H4: Conspiracist nonpartisans will be less likely than conspiracist partisans to endorse 
conspiracy theories on a strictly partisan bias.
Campbell et al. (1960) posits that Independents are really just partisans in disguise, 
but recent studies on conspiracism (Hargrove et al., 2007) find that Independents 
often subscribe to theories implicating both parties. I predict that Independents 
with conspiracist tendencies will be less discriminatory in their endorsements of 
conspiracy theories (i.e., they should accept theories that implicate Democrat and 
Republican officials) than conspiracist partisans, who should endorse along party 
lines. Confirmation of this hypothesis would provide further evidence of partisan bias 
in conspiracy theory selection.
Data and Methods
I propose a cross-sectional study wherein participants are chosen from a Survey 
Sampling International (SSI) panel and asked to complete a survey that features two 
separate components. The ideal study sample is a balanced mixture of Democratic, 
Republican, and Independent identifiers, with varying degrees of partisan loyalty 
among the Democratic and Republican respondents. The first survey component [see 
Figure 1] is designed to gauge the respondent’s propensity for holding and accepting 
conspiracist beliefs. Previous empirical research on conspiracism (Goertzel, 1994; 
Hargrove et al., 2007; Oliver and Wood, 2014) employed survey instruments that 
questioned respondents about their opinions on specific conspiracy theories, but did 
not test for conspiracist tendencies. Consequently, it is difficult to know whether 
the respondents endorsed on the basis of conspiracist predispositions, partisan 
attachment, or both. This preliminary survey attempts to disentangle the two so that 
accurate judgments can be made.
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The second survey component [see Figure 2] measures partisan attachment. In the 
opening portion of the survey, I ask the respondent to identify their partisan affiliation 
and indicate the strength of their attachment on a 1-7 point scale, with 1 being 
“very weak” and 7 being “very strong.” For the remainder of the survey, I present 
various conspiracy theories and ask the respondent to indicate whether they have 
previously heard of the theory as well as how they much they believe it. I administer 
two versions of the survey: one where each conspiratorial stimulus includes a partisan 
element, which will be administered to the treatment group, and one where each is 
missing a partisan element, which will be administered to the control group. The 
conspiracy theories featured in the survey are all factual, insofar as they are currently in 
circulation. I have not “invented” any theories for the purposes of this study; however, 
I do modify certain theories by adding or subtracting partisan elements from them. 
For instance, in the Cancer stimulus (“Cures for cancer exist but are being actively 
suppressed by the Trump administration to sustain the cancer-prevention industry”) 
I introduce a Republican element (“the Trump administration”) when in reality the 
theory, or at least the version accepted by the mainstream, does not implicate the 
Trump administration as a conspirator. I also ask respondents whether they have 
previously heard the conspiracy theory to see if a lack of awareness regarding the 
theory gives them pause before evaluating it. On questions that feature a partisan 
element, I suspect that strong partisans will indicate that they previously heard the 
theory when it implicates an outparty member, even if the current conception of the 
theory is partisan-neutral, meaning that it implicates no particular political party.
1.  “We think and are often told that we have free will, 
but we are much less free to do what we want than 
we are led to believe.”
How much do you agree with the preceding state-
ment?
 a. Strongly agree
 b. Agree
 c. No opinion
 d. Disagree
 e. Strongly disagree
4.  “There are important things that the United 
States government is currently lying to us 
about.”
  How much do you agree with the preceding 
statement?
 a. Strongly agree
 b. Agree
 c. No opinion
 d. Disagree
 e. Strongly disagree
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FIGURE 2. Sample of partisan attachment survey
Once I have collected the results of the survey, I will separate the respondents into 
two groups: (1) those who qualify as having a conspiracist predisposition and (2) those 
who do not. I arrive at these classifications by assigning values to each type of answer 
choice in the preliminary survey and aggregating and averaging each respondent’s 
responses. Separating those who have conspiracist tendencies from those who do not 
will allow me to isolate the effects of partisan affiliation and accurately evaluate the 
role that it plays in conspiracy theory selection.
Discussion
Zaller’s (1992) model of opinion formation conceives of public opinion as being 
largely a product of elite discourse. Because conspiracy theories begin at the mass-
public level and typically grow out of a distrust of elites, conspiracist thinking represents 
a curious inversion of this model (Oliver and Wood 2014). Although conspiracy 
theories are as old as human history (Davis 1971), with the help of the internet and 
other modern information technologies, they are increasingly ubiquitous. People are 
in real danger of interacting with, accepting, and holding onto ideas that make them 
cynical about and distrustful of government. Various opinion polls, for instance, show 
that a majority of Americans believe that the Bush administration lied about the 9/11 
attacks in some form or another; a small but still substantial portion of the population 
believes that the administration was actually complicit in the attacks. If these beliefs 
are sincere, and some scholars suggest that they are (Sunstein and Vermeule 2009), 
then it raises serious concerns about the future of American democracy. A more 
comprehensive understanding of conspiracism would help to arm the public against 
potentially harmful ideas.
2.  Cures for cancer exist but are being actively sup-
pressed by the government to sustain the cancer 
prevention industry.
Have you heard of the preceding statement before?
 a. Yes
 b. No
 How much do you believe the preceding 
statement?
 a. Strongly agree
 b. Agree
 c. No opinion
 d. Disagree
 e. Strongly disagree
2.  Cures for cancer exist but are being actively sup-
pressed by the Trump administration to sustain the 
cancer prevention industry.
Have you heard of the preceding statement before?
a. Yes
b. No
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Were this study to be implemented, I would expect for partisan bias to be 
strongest among conspiracist partisans, given that (1) individuals with conspiracist 
predispositions are more likely to subscribe to conspiratorial beliefs than others 
(Oliver and Wood 2014) and (2) partisans are more likely than nonpartisans to accept 
or reject conspiracy theories on the basis of partisan identification alone. In narrower 
terms, I suspect that respondents whose responses code as “strong” on the partisan 
and conspiracist scales would endorse (a) a larger number of conspiracy theories (b) 
along party lines than other respondents. Furthermore, I expect that the evidence 
would show that partisans—both conspiracist and nonconspiracist—are less likely to 
endorse a conspiracy theory when there is no partisan element present, rather than 
when there is. Considering the extremely partisan nature of American politics today 
(Abramowitz and Webster, 2015; Mason, 2015), and the fact that modern conspiracy 
theories are often framed in partisan language (Knight, 2002), concerns about the 
state of American democracy are not without merit.
I expect that my findings will prompt scholars to reevaluate the importance of 
partisan attachment as it relates to conspiracist thinking. Recent literature on political 
misinformation (Einstein and Hochschild, 2015; Meirick, 2013) identifies partisan 
attachment as one of the central motivating forces behind conspiracism. While it is 
certainly true that partisan attitudes affect the interaction between individuals and 
conspiracy theories, they do not per se cause individuals to accept or reject conspiracy 
theories. Instead, as I have argued, and as I expect for my findings to show, partisan 
attachment depends on underlying conspiracist predispositions in order to matter in 
the accept-reject calculus. Therefore, it would be prudent for future research to focus 
on the factors that cause or influence these predispositions, rather than on factors 
such as partisanship that merely modify them.
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